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BERMUDA H: THE BRITISH REVOLUTION OF 1976
HARRIET OSWALT HILL
On July 23, 1977, the United States and the United Kingdom
signed a new air services agreement respecting future air trans-
portation between the two nations and their territories. Known
popularly as Bermuda II,' the new executive agreement' came
about as a result of almost one year of heated negotiations! and
replaces the 31-year old Bermuda I Agreement of 1946." The
British had formally denounced the Bermuda I Agreement on
June 22, 1976, and under Article 13 of the old Agreement, the
parties had twelve months in which to negotiate a new agreement
or suffer the termination of the old one without a replacement."
A. History of Bermuda I
Since the institution of Bermuda II, several problems and con-
troversies have arisen as to its constitutional status and the practical
application of its provisions. Some have challenged the Agree-
ment as unconstitutional on the basis that it should have been a
treaty rather than an executive agreement.! In addition., there have
been practical problems with regard to the details of the new
Bermuda Agreement's application on a daily basis. Bermuda II
' Bermuda II Agreement, July 23, 1977, United States-United Kingdom,
Stat. -, T.I.A.S. No. 8641 [hereinafter cited as Bermuda II Agreement].
'An executive agreement is contracted between the heads of state of two or
more nations to cover generally perfunctory relations in a certain area (such as
aviation) between the two or more countries.
3 BUSINESS WEEK, September 13, 1976, at 37.
" Bermuda I Agreement, February 11, 1946, United States-United Kingdom,
60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No. 1507 [hereinafter cited as Bermuda I Agreement]. On
air services agreements, see generally Gertler, Bilateral Air Transport Agreements:
Non-Bermuda Reflections, 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 779 (1976); Diamond, The Ber-
muda Agreement Revisited: A Look at the Past, Present and Future of Bilateral
Air Transport Agreements, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 419 (1975); Lissitzyn, Bilateral
Agreements on Air Transport, 30 J. AnR L. & CoM. 249 (1964).
Bermuda I Agreement, supra note 4, Article 13.
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., August 1, 1977, at 26.
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suddently no longer appears to be the panacea to troubled United
States-British aviation relations as anticipated.
The United Kingdom was, in fact, the original partner with the
United States in the establishment of bilateral air services agree-
ments.! Up to the time of its renunciation by the British, Bermuda
I had served as the model air services agreement after which all
other such international agreements were fashioned.8 Bermuda I
has been referred to as the Magna Charta of international aviation,
emphasizing its status among international air agreements! After
World War II, the British feared the United States' position of
strength in commercial aviation. To keep from effectively being
forced out of the competitive air market, the British desired the
negotiation of a capacity agreement which would limit the number
of flights and airline designations one participating country could
institute." The air services agreement that resulted was Bermuda
I, which specified points to be served by both countries' air car-
riers and which formally established what has come to be known
as the Bermuda Capacity Principles." These principles inculcated
the "five freedoms" of the air" which had been previously stated
at the multinational Chicago Convention of 1944."3
The Bermuda Capacity Principles, strongly supported through-
out by the United States, state:
[T]here shall be a fair and equal opportunity for the carriers of
the two nations to operate on any routes between their respective
territories. [T]he interests of the air carriers of the other Govern-
ment shall be taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly
the services which the latter provides on all or part of the same
routes. [I]t is the understanding of both Governments that services
provided shall retain as their primary objective the provision of
7 Bilateral air services agreements are the usual diplomatic instruments where-
by air transport between two nations is established and regulated.8 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 5, 1976, at 29.
BUSINESS WEEK, August 16, 1976, at 104.
10 Id.
11 Bermuda I Agreement, supra note 4, § 4-6. See note 13 inf ra.
" BUSINESS WEEK, March 28, 1977, at 51.
" Convention on Civil Aviation, penned for signature at Chicago, Illinois,
Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (1948) [here-
inafter cited as Chicago Convention of 1944]. This conference was a major at-
tempt to define the guidelines to be followed multinationally in post-World War
II civil aviation. It was at this convention that the "five freedoms of the air"
were enunciated and accepted in principle.
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capacity adequate to the traffic demands between the country of
which such air carrier is a national and the country of ultimate
destination of the traffic."
The five freedoms, considered so critical by the United States
for over thirty years," consist of (1) the freedom to fly over the
territory of a foreign country, (2) the freedom to stop in a foreign
country for fuel, (3) the freedom to carry passengers from the
home country to a foreign country, (4) the freedom to carry
passengers in the reverse direction, and (5) the freedom to carry
passengers from one foreign country to another." The United
States has consistently fought to maintain both the Bermuda
Capacity Principles and the five freedoms." On the other hand,
the British, before renegotiating for the present Bermuda II Agree-
ment, were intended on either eliminating totally or, at least re-
ducing, the fifth of the five freedom rights,' the freedom to carry
passengers from one foreign country to another. This fifth right
allowed U.S. flag carriers to pick up British passengers in Britain
and its territories and fly them on to other points, thus depriving
the British airlines of these passengers and revenues. The United
Kingdom came to believe that, under the Bermuda principles, it
was losing passengers, and the subsequent profits therefrom, to
the United States carriers." The British government expressed the
opinion that the benefits to the United States were far greater
than the benefits to Great Britain." Accordingly the United King-
dom issued its June 22, 1976 renunciation of Bermuda I and
sought renegotiation of the treaty with the United States. Accord-
"4 Bermuda I Agreement, supra note 4, § 5 4-6.
"' The U.S. considered the five freedoms critical because of their great im-
pact on improving the economic status of U.S. airlines by permitting greater
flight freedom throughout the world and allowing U.S. planes to carry more for-
eign passengers.
"BUSINESS WEEK, March 28, 1977, at 51; See generally Chicago Convention
of 1944, supra note 13.
17 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 5, 1976, at 29.
"Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 27, 1976, at 29.
1' BUSINESS WEEK, August 16, 1976, at 104.
According to Edmund Dell, Britain's Secretary of State for Trade, the
Bermuda I Agreement ". . . has over the years become out of date . . .and no
longer corresponds satisfactorily in the view of Her Majesty's government to the
conditions of the 1970s. It has been evident for some time that the benefits the
Bermuda Agreement confers on the United States are much in excess of the
benefits to the United Kingdom." Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 5, 1976, at 29.
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ing to one British memorandum sent to the State Department, "[w]e
shall be looking for an increase in the earnings of British carriers,
and we see no practical means of achieving this except through a
reduction in the earnings of United States carriers."'"
One of the specific complaints the United Kingdom registered
against the system under Bermuda I was an objection to the
sudden nature of Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) rejections of
major International Air Transport Association (IATA) fare agree-
ment provisions."5 The British believed that the CAB should be
required to give notice of such dissatisfaction to foreign govern-
ments within fifteen days after the IATA package is filed with the
Board, as the Bermuda I Agreement requires. This, urged the
British, should be the procedure rather than the one then used by
the Civil Aeronautics Board.' The British were also disturbed by
the 1966 Amendment to Bermuda r in which the United States
gave British Airways rights in the Pacific in exchange for the rights
of Pan American World Airways and Trans World Airways to
fly beyond London to almost every European city of any size.
The United Kingdom wanted the new agreement to have provisions
for government intervention in a carrier's decision to offer capacity
levels ' in any market." However, the United States' goal of main-
taining only limited government intervention in carriers' decisions
directly conflicted with the British position."
The position taken by the United Kingdom was basically that
the old Bermuda I Agreement was a laissez-faire approach to air
services, leaving performance regulation to the airlines, and that
21 BUSINESS WEEK, September 13, 1976, at 37.
IATA Fare Agreements establish fares for air transport multilaterally for
member nations.
2 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 26, 1976, at 29.
24 Agreement amending the Bermuda I Agreement, May 27, 1966, United
States-United Kingdom, 17 U.S.T. 683, T.I.A.S. 6019. Amendment dealt with
the deletion of several paragraphs of the 1946 agreement and the substitution of
a new schedule of routes for the original one schedule which apparently allowed
the British some more intermediate points on its Pacific route in exchange for the
U.S. being allowed to fly to a great many more European cities.
" BUSINESS WEEK, August 16, 1976, at 104.
26 Capacity levels refer to the number of flights per week between two cities or
along a particular route.
27 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 26, 1976, at 29.
28 BUSINESS WEEK, September 13, 1976, at 37.
COMMENTS
this model agreement was outdated and had been responsible for
creating the over-capacity problem" that existed in the North
Atlantic as well as in other areas.' In addition, the United King-
dom believed that the ex post facto method of review of capacity
levels and problems established by Bermuda I was ineffective in
practice and was seldom used in any event and, therefore, should
be replaced."
To remedy the situation the British believed to be so untenable,
the negotiators demanded several fundamental changes in the new
agreement. First, the United Kingdom wanted only one airline
from each country to fly any route between the United States and
Britain. Additionally, there was to be government control of the
capacity of aircraft flying between the two countries. The British
also demanded an end to the fifth freedom rights the United States
had enjoyed by stopping much of the U.S. carriers' fifth freedom
rights east of London and west of Hong Kong." Recognizing that
U.S. carriers had been bringing in three times the revenue as
British carriers on international flights originating in British terri-
tory, the British negotiators decided to try to achieve a fifty-fifty
split of the two countries' airline traffic, something the United
States negotiators were likely never to agree to in any event.' How-
ever, this "demand" was probably merely an attempt to bring the
balance of earnings to a more favorable position from the British
point of view?'
The major British proposal regarding capacity control in the
North Atlantic called for governmental establishment of a mini-
When too many flights per week are allowed between two points or along
a certain route, overcapacity results; i.e., there will never be enough passengers
on such flights to economically justify continuing that scheduled flight. This is a
problem that existed in the North Atlantic before Bermuda II and resulted in loss
of revenue for the airlines which were flying empty seats and increased prices
for the passengers flying.
"' Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., November 1, 1976, at 26.
31 Id. The British objection to ex post facto review probably stemmed from
the fact that review of problems after the fact amounted to "too little, too late"
from the standpoint of British aviation. The damage in effect was already done.
32 Bermuda I Agreement, supra note 4, Annex III(b); Bermuda II Agreement,
supra note 1, Annex 1, Section 1.
33 BUSINESS WEEK, March 28, 1977, at 46.
" Id.
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mum capacity base,' allowing airlines to agree among themselves
on additional capacity increases. Should the airlines not agree on
additional capacity, if additional capacity were needed, the allow-
able capacity would fall to the minimum set by the governments.
The United Kingdom contended that this plan would solve the
over-capacity problems without depressing the air market and
would strike a medium between governmental control and laissez-
faire."
Throughout the renegotiation, and despite all British arguments
and demands, the United States consistently held to the position
that the status quo be maintained and the old Bermuda principles
be upheld." By late March of 1977, the two negotiating teams
had not come any closer to a compromise agreement than they
had been when serious negotiations started in December of 1976."
As the June 22, 1977 deadline grew closer and no settlement
had been reached, the governments and airlines of both countries
became alarmed lest air services between the United States and the
United Kingdom be interrupted for lack of a new agreement.
Fully recognizing the problems that would result from such an
interruption of services, the negotiators finally came to an agree-
ment at 5:10 a.m., London time, June 22, 1977-ten minutes
after the expiration of Bermuda I."
B. Bermuda II
Bermuda II is the compromise that arose out of this lengthy
negotiation and tight timetable. Under the new agreement, the
British gain the most distinct advantages compared to the few
new points gained by the United States. According to Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, "The new agreement transfers net economic
benefit from the U.S. flag systems to the British flag. That was
the purpose of the British denunciation of the old agreement."'
35 The minimum capacity base idea basically called for the establishment of
carrier capacity allowances at a minimum (i.e. allowing for enough flights to
service the area's needs, but no more) to avoid overservicing a certain air mar-
ket. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., January 3, 1977, at 26.
1 Id.
67 Id.
38 BUSINESS WEEK, March 28, 1977, at 46; Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., April
25, 1977, at 51; Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 30, 1977, at 26.
31 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 27, 1977, at 26; TIME, July 4, 1977, at 64.
4OAv. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 27, 1977, at 27.
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The major advantage obtained by the United States flag carriers
was the unlimited blind sector rights beyond London into Europe.
Blind sector rights permit U.S. carriers to carry passengers, who
originate in the United States, through London and beyond to
any point in Europe."' By way of contrast, fifth freedom rights
allow passengers originating in London to travel beyond London
on United States carriers. ' While gaining significant blind sector
rights, the United States surrendered fifth freedom rights to twenty-
two cities starting immediately, ' and will sacrifice fifth freedom
rights from Great Britain to Belgium and Austria in three years
and to Holland, Sweden, and Norway in five years." By surrender-
ing these fifth freedom rights, the United States carriers lost the
privilege of carrying British nationals and other passengers origi-
nating on British territory from that point beyond to other coun-
tries. The United States retains permanent fifth freedom rights to
Frankfurt, Germany, for two United States carriers, and to Ham-
burg, Berlin, and Munich, plus eleven more cities around the
world, for one United States flag carrier." These routes should be
compared with the twenty-nine fifth freedom points granted the
United States in the Bermuda I Agreement.'
Another major provision of the new agreement requires that
each country designate only two carriers on the New York-London
and Los Angeles-London routes, while all other city pairs which
include London may be served by only one carrier from each
country." An additional carrier from each nation, however, may
be designated should the traffic on that segment increase or should
one previously designated carrier cease to compete sufficiently."
On routes other than New York-London and Los Angeles-London,
41 Id. at 26; Bermuda II Agreement, supra note 1, Annex I, Section 5.
42 Id.
43 None of the 22 cities is presently served. Id.
" Id.; Bermuda II Agreement, supra note 1, Annex I, Section I, U.S. Route 1,
n.2.
,Id.; See also n.3.
" Bermuda I Agreement, supra note 4, Annex III(b) (1) & (2).
4, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 27, 1977, at 27; Bermuda II Agreement,
supra note 1, Art. 3(2); the one carrier limitation is no doubt to avoid the over-
capacity problem previously discussed.48 Av. WEEK & SPACE, TECH., July 27, 1977, at 27. Bermuda II Agreement,
supra note 1, Art. (3)(2)(b)(i) & (ii).
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each contracting party to the Agreement has the right to designate
a second carrier when (1) total traffic exceeds 600,000 passengers
per year, (2) one carrier takes on more than 450,000 passengers
per year regardless of the total carried by both carriers, or (3)
one carrier decides not to compete on that route or offers only
token service." These provisions are intended as a limit on ca-
pacity in addition to the limitations placed on routes and flight
frequencies. The new agreement specifically recognizes the prob-
lems created by overcapacity and undercapacity and seeks to
more closely control the airlines which are primarily to blame
for these problems.' Capacity controls seemed to be one of the
primary objectives of the British in seeking the Bermuda II Agree-
ment, just as it had been when they sought the first Bermuda
compact. They realized that overcapacity was simply leading to
loss for both passengers having to pay higher fares and for the
airlines flying the empty seats. Even the U.S. Department of State
recognized the excess capacity problem." Under Bermuda II,
though neither government has an outright veto over the other
country's schedules, the carriers for each country are to file their
schedules and proposals for fare charges for "rescreening" by the
other government." Should the other government object, it may
then request consultation on the matter."
British carriers also gain four new routes under Bermuda II.
They are a London-Seattle route in competition with Pan Ameri-
can, no intermediate point restrictions on the London-San Francisco
route and a three-year exclusive route from London to Houston
with an added route to Atlanta and Dallas at the end of the three-
year period.' In addition, the United States will be permitted to
compete with the British on the London-Houston route at that
49 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 27, 1977, at 27. Token service would result
where a carrier makes a basic decision to no longer fly a route and offers only
one or two flights along the route per week, in essence allowing any other carrier
on the route to take over service on that route with no overcapacity servicing
resulting.
51Bermuda II Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 2, para. 5. "The Contracting
Parties recognize that airline actions leading to excess capacity or to the under-
provision of capacity can both run counter to the interests of the traveling public."
51 BUSINESS WEEK, August 16, 1976, at 108.
' See generally Bermuda II Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 3(2) and 8(11).
" Bermuda II Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 11, para. 5.
"4 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 27, 1977, at 26.
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time.' During the three-year period, the United States will service
the Atlanta and Dallas-Fort Worth to London routes without
British competition." In the Pacific, the United States sacrificed
one of its important fifth freedom rights. The United States sur-
rendered the right to carry fifth freedom passengers from Mid-
way, Wake, Manila, Seoul, and Taipei to Hong King, and beyond
Hong Kong to Macao, mainland China, Indo-China, and Burma."
The British, on the other hand, gained in the Pacific in that they
may now maintain their Hong Kong route to the United States
through Guam and Honolulu and may, in addition, choose two of
three West Coast cities in the United States as gateways." The three
cities are San Francisco, Seattle, and Los Angeles."' In addition
to the newly negotiated routes, the British were able to imple-
ment their proposed "fall-back formula." This formula provides
that in the event an agreement cannot be reached concerning
frequencies between the airlines, the capacity levels will "fall
back" to the established minimum while the two countries con-
sult. The frequencies will be proposed in the future on the basis of
growth forecasts predicted by each country's carriers." Annex II
of the Agreement also exempts the United Kingdom's Concorde
aircraft operations by designated airlines from the capacity re-
strictions placed on North Atlantic routes. In exchange for this
concession, the United States' designated carrier operating on the
Washington-London route will not be required to fly less than
seven roundtrips per week as required under paragraph 6 of An-
nex I.'
Finally, the major provisions of Bermuda II for settlement of
disputes and uncertainties are the "consultation" provisions."
Article 16 provides that either the U.S. or Britain may "consult"
5Id.
5Id.
57 Id. at 27; Bermuda II Agreement, supra note 1, Annex I, Section 5(8).
68 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 27, 1977, at 26. Bermuda I Agreement,
supra note 1, Art. l(i). These gateways are the points of first arrival in the terri-
tory of the other Contracting Party and the points served by designated airlines
in the territory of the other Contracting Party.
" Id.; Bermuda II Agreement, supra note 1, Annex I, U.K. Route 6, n.3.
60Id.
61 Bermuda II Agreement, supra note I, Annex 11(8).
" Id., Art. 3(l)(b); 3(5); 5(2); 11(5); 16.
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with the other on matters concerning the interpretation, applica-
tion, or amendment of the Agreement.' However, consultative
processes are not to be used excessively or unduly"4 as this might
lead to "detailed supervision of airline scheduling" for both coun-
tries, clearly a result the United States, which seeks limited gov-
ernment supervision, wishes to avoid." Should consultation prove
unproductive, however, Article 17 of the Agreement requires that
the dispute be referred "for decision to some person or body" on
the agreement of both parties.6 If the parties fail to agree, then
the request of either party will cause the dispute to be submitted
to arbitration, subject to the procedures set out in Article 17,
paragraphs 2(a) and (b). Under these sections, each party names
an arbitrator within 30 days of the receipt of the arbitration re-
quest and, by agreement within 60 days, the parties are then to
choose a third arbitrator. If either party does not select an arbi-
trator or the third is not agreed upon, either party may approach
the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint the
necessary persons within 30 days."
Beginnings of Dispute
No sooner had the Bermuda II Agreement been signed than out-
cries were raised by airline officials in the United States." Several
U.S. carriers, warning of "country-by-country blackmail" against
the U.S. as a result of the last minute compromise agreement,
argued that the threatened cessation of services would have been
better than Bermuda II." The Bermuda compromise, it was charged,
would encourage other countries with which the U.S. had air
services agreements to renounce them with hope of getting favor-
63 Id., Art. 16. "Either Contracting Party may at any time request consultations
on the implementation, interpretation, application, or amendment of this Agree-
ment or compliance with this Agreement. Such consultations shall begin within
a period of 60 days from the date the other Contracting Party receives the re-
quest, unless otherwise agreed by the Contracting Parties."
"Bermuda II Agreement, supra note I, Annex 11(2).
05 Id.
'Id., Art. 17.
"Id., Art. 17(1) & (2)(a) & (b). Such an arbitral system is common in inter-
national agreements of all kinds. However, the decisions which are produced by
these procedures are rarely satisfactory to at least one of the parties involved,
even though a formal agreement binds that party to the arbitrators' decision.
"Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 18, 1977, at 25.
69Id.
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able concessions from the U.S. as Britain had." The position held
by many is that the U.S. has demonstrated by its compromise with
the British that it can be "blackmailed" into agreements simply
by a threatened cessation of air services. 1 Instead, some U.S. car-
rier officials urged the United States should have allowed air serv-
ices to terminate rather than submit to British demands, realizing
how politically and economically severe the service cut-off would
have been for the British with the decrease in U.S. tourism." Now
many airline and government officials fear that the United States has
given the rest of the world the impression that air services agree-
ments with the United States should be denounced to gain the U.S.
governments' attention and the U.S. will be willing to concede
strategic advantages in commercial services to prevent termina-
tion of air services, even for a short period of time." Several
carrier officials placed blame for the "unfavorable" agreement on
President Carter, who was reportedly concerned that a cessation of
United States-United Kingdom air services would force British
Prime Minister James Callaghan's Labor government to resign."
Government officials denied there had ever been any discussion
of this problem between the two men." For all the outcry at the
compromise's announcement, however, both the United States flag
carriers and government agreed that Bermuda II is not severely
damaging to most United States carriers." This concurrence, how-
ever, did not assuage the feelings of many air carriers in the United
States who were especially dismayed over the loss by the United
States of important fifth freedom rights in Europe and the Pacific
and the gain of fifth freedom rights by the British to Mexico City
from Boston, Detroit, Baltimore/Washington, Philadelphia, and
New York." "What we gave the British was access to 90 percent
70 Id.
71 Id.
7 "We held all of the cards if we had just been willing to stand our ground.
But sometimes we seem to be more concerned with the other guy's image than
we are with our own." Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 18, 1977, at 25-26.
73 Id. at 25.
74 Id. at 26.
' Id.
6 Id.
" Id.; Bermuda II Agreement, supra note 1, Annex I, U.K. Route 3.
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of the United States with very little in exchange."" Though dis-
turbed by the immediate impact of Bermuda II on United King-
dom-United States air services, more carriers are concerned with
the long-term impact of this new agreement on. United States air
services agreements around the world. Just as Bermuda I served
as the "precedent-setting agreement" for all subsequent bilateral
air services agreements between the United States and other coun-
tries after World War II, so Bermuda II is seen as the new model
on which future bilaterals will be based."9 In fact, the "blackmail"
predicted by some has in one sense already begun. At the time
of the signing of Bermuda II, the United States was already sched-
uled to resume bilateral negotiations with the Japanese govern-
ment in October, 1977." With Bermuda II as a precedent, it ap-
peared difficult to deny to the Japanese compromises the United
States had already given the British.'
Constitutional Issues
As if international calls for the denunciation and renegotiation
of the old Bermuda I-style agreements were not sufficient, sud-
denly congressional ire in the U.S. was stirred against the new
Agreement and demands for committee hearings and court chal-
lenges to Bermuda II were in the offing." As required by the
Case Bill,"' the Bermuda Agreement, like any other executive agree-
ment, must be sent to Congress, only after its signing, for the
information of Congress." However, the Case Bill only allows the
Senate to see the result of the executive agreement-a document
already signed and agreed to by the President, as was the case with
78 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 18, 1977, at 26.
79 Id.
80 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., August 1, 1977, at 26.
"I Id.; Practical difficulties with Bermuda II itself have surfaced as well. In late
February and early March of 1978, the British "suddenly" refused to permit
Braniff to institute its low Dallas/Fort Worth to London fares as scheduled and
also refused permission to land at Heathrow Airport in London as originally
planned. Due to this controversy which the British ultimately won, Dallas to
London flights were delayed and passengers greatly inconvenienced.
"' Ellingsworth, Bermuda Pact Sparks Opposition, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
August 1, 1977, at 26.
"
3S. 596, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 4094 (1972). Act of August




Bermuda II. When there is an agreement in existence which has
the force of international law,' there is usually not much the Sen-
ate can do after the fact. In any event, according to staff members,
the Senate Commerce Aviation Subcommittee was to hold hear-
ings on the Bermuda II controversy in 1977 and the staff of the
Aviation Subcommittee of the House Committee on Public Works
and Transportation indicated hearings might be forthcoming."S
In addition to the congressional discussion of Bermuda II,
potential court challenges have begun to materialize since shortly
after the Agreement was made public. A mobilization of interested
parties began under the guidance of representatives of the City of
Tampa, Florida." Tampa had apparently been named by the CAB
in its recommended decision on the transatlantic route proceeding
as a gateway city, but was left out as a gateway city in Bermuda
11.8 According to interests involved, the President usurped con-
gressional powers in this area." The apparent basis for the serious
challenge by these parties and others is the belief that Bermuda II
violates the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.* They argue that Ber-
muda II specifies a set route structure that was agreed to by the
Executive Branch alone and, in contrast, the Federal Aviation
" An agreement signed by the U.S. becomes part of the law of the U.S. and
has international effect. 77 AM. JUR. 2d, UNITED STATES 845 (1975). Logically,
to abrogate such an agreement on purely domestic constitutional grounds would
weaken the entire fabric of U.S. international relations. Nations would become
unsure of their positions and the validity of their bilateral agreements with the
U.S.
,1 Ellingsworth, Bermuda Pact Sparks Opposition, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
August 1, 1977, at 26. This Bill was the Senate's response in 1972 to the growing
number of executive agreements, several of them secret, which began proliferat-
ing after World War II. Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations,
71 MicH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
7 Ellingsworth, Bermuda Pact Sparks Opposition, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
August 1, 1977, at 26.
88 Id.
id.
" Id.; Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§5 1301 et seq. (1970), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52
Stat. 973. The belief that agreements such as Bermuda II violate the Federal Avi-
ation Act seems to stem from the argument that this Act vested in the CAB the
sole authority to establish routes. This was the apparent intent of Congress in
enacting the statute and, to allow a bilateral agreement which is not even sub-
mitted to Congress for approval to circumvent the CAB's authority, is violative
of this intent and Congressional prerogatives.
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Act gives the CAB sole authority to grant routes." Also, spokes-
men for these interests note that the Federal Aviation Act is based
on a requirement of competition while Bermuda II is "anticom-
petitive" and restricts capacity."
According to the proponents of the above-mentioned argu-
ments, all air services agreements should be considered treaties
and, as such, should be subject to Senate ratification."3 The whole
question of whether or not the Constitution requires air services
agreements and many other kinds of agreements to be submitted
to the Senate for ratification is not as simple as one might first
believe. The debate has been conducted throughout U.S. history
and certainly started long before the first transatlantic flight."
What is initially troublesome about the constitutionality of such
executive agreements as Bermuda II is the practical consequence
of a finding of unconstitutionality. According to attorneys for
the U.S. government, should Bermuda II be ruled a treaty by
the courts, all bilateral air services agreements would be uncon-
stitutional and would fail for lack of Senate ratification.' Certainly,
such a result would have an immediate economic effect on air
services conducted by the United States throughout the world.
The process for obtaining air agreements would be greatly pro-
longed as negotiators attempted to satisfy the demands of the
other side and the demands of Congress at the same time. Then,
after the negotiation and agreement would come the ratification
process in the Senate, where any agreement would be subject to
severe scrutiny and debate on the basis of constituent pressures of
the individual members and the pressures of the economy and
the public at large. These are the very dangers the executive
branch officials foresee if bilateral air agreements are given treaty
status." Politics could also prove a major obstacle. One great
91 Ellingsworth, Bermuda Pact Sparks Opposition, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
August 1, 1977, at 26.
92 Id.
03 Id.
"Berger, supra note 85, at 37-38.
5Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., August 1, 1977, at 27.
"This author suggests that, perhaps, as a practical matter, were all bilaterals
declared unconstitutional, the Senate, to avoid severe economic and political con-
sequences, might summarily ratify all existing agreements. This action would cer-
tainly be the most feasible way of solving any immediate problem as to the con-
tinuation of air services between the U.S. and other countries.
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fear is that many additional routes might be added at the insistence
of powerful politicians in the Senate."' Executive Branch officials
also see disruption of services as a result of any decision to make
bilateral air services agreements rank as treaties for ratification
purposes."
However, after the list of "horrors" is paraded by those who
oppose any attempt to classify air services executive agreements
as treaties, the essential question of the constitutionality of these
agreements such as Bermuda II remains. Should bilateral air serv-
ices agreements be classified as treaties, thus subject to Senate
ratification, to avoid the undesired effects of such an agreement
as Bermuda II?
One of the only points that seems clear in the dispute over
presidential versus congressional power to authorize international
agreements is the recognition that the Framers of the Constitution
believed that it would be too great a danger to place the exclusive
treaty-making power in the hands of the President alone."' There-
fore, the President's power to negotiate and agree to foreign agree-
ments was coupled with the "advice and consent of the Senate." '
The Constitution mentions only "treaty" in this context with the
requirement of ratification by two-thirds of the Senate; however,
nowhere does the Constitution define the term "treaty.'' 1 The
Framers were apparently aware that other forms of international
compacts were in existence, as these are mentioned as being pro-
hibited to the States.'0 ' In fact, the term "executive agreement" is
of fairly recent vintage in international use,' *  and this adds to the
consternation of constitutional scholars trying to determine if
the Framers envisioned the separate negotiation of international
agreements by the President without any congressional consent
" Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., August 1, 1977, at 27. "I can foresee 14 cities
being added to the list of points in a bilateral because some powerful senators
want it that way," according to one Administration official.
8Id.
00 Berger, supra note 85, at 37-38.
100 U.S. CONST., art. 2, S 2.
" Berger, supra note 85, at 33. See generally: United States v. Guy W. Capps,
Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953); Consumer's Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers,
352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.C. 1973).
"' U.S. CONST., art. 1, S 10.
10' Berger, supra note 85, at 33.
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or input. According to Senator Case, after whom the previously-
noted Case Bill was named, "[i]t seems clear that the Founding
Fathers intended any agreement with a foreign country on a
matter of substance to be embraced within the term (treaty).
Certainly they did not intend that the President must get Senate
approval of perfunctory routine minor agreements . ,1o. Then
the suggestion has been made that the Founders did countenance
a distinction between different kinds of international compacts-
some of great import requiring the consultation and perusal of
the Senate and others of a minor character that the President could
conclude alone under his authority as "chief negotiator" for the
United States in foreign affairs." However, if the subject matter
and scope of the agreement in question be the determinative fac-
tor in holding it either an executive agreement or a treaty, the
Constitution still leaves no guidelines on which to base such a de-
cision. What is a weighty and substantive matter and what is
not? Though the Constitution remains silent, the United States
Supreme Court has given some insight into the problem of where
the line is to be drawn.
In United States v. Belmont,"' the Court indicated that "[A]
protocol, a modus vivendi, a postal convention, and agreements
like that . . . are illustrations" of the types of subject matter that
could be constitutionally covered in an executive agreement not
requiring Senate ratification."' Admittedly, this is not an exhaus-
tive list, but it was one of the first times the Supreme Court or
any other court had been willing to go so far as to specify some
of the legal uses of executive agreements by the President. There
is very little case law in this area, and the. Court has been very
reluctant when a case has arisen to make any definitive rulings
due to the highly sensitive nature of this question. In Belmont,'
however, the Supreme Court did rule that the President had author-
ity to act under a federal statute to conclude an international agree-
104 Ackerman, Executive Agreements, The Treaty-Making Clause, and Strict
Constructionism, 8 LOYOLA OF Los ANGELES L. REV. 587, 592, n.29 (1975)
thereinafter cited as LOYOLA].
'5 Compare the constitutional grants of power to the President and Senate
contained in U.S. CONST., art. II, §5 2 and 3.




ment involving commercial or trade matters.'" It must be strongly
noted, however, that this particular presidential authority derived
from an explicit federal act.' In United States v. Pink,111 dealing
with the same international agreement, the Court reiterated the
ruling in Belmont and added that a treaty is a law of the land
under the supremacy clause and such international compacts and
agreements as the one involved in that case have a similar dig-
nity."' This situation also fell under the same congressional act
authorizing the President's conduct to negotiate this agreement.
As a congressionally authorized pact, the executive agreement did
not require Senate participation."'
In the later landmark case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube v.
Sawyer, ' a concurring opinion by the Court suggested that be-
cause of the separation of powers doctrine, the President could
only act by himself (i.e., without prior congressional authorization)
in an area of foreign affairs in which Congress had not acted and
that the President was "preempted" when congressional action
conclusively covered the subject matter of the area.' In other
words, in this "quasi-legislative" area of presidential power, pursu-
ant to congressional will or in the face of congressional inertia, the
President may make self-executing executive agreements.'
Finally, in the case of Reid v. Covert, ' the Court proclaimed
that executive agreements clearly may not be made in violation
of federal constitutional rights-here in the rights of the criminally
accused to jury trial. Reid, therefore, stands for the proposition
that criminal rights under the Federal Constitution may not be
109 Id.
" ld.; Of course, if Congress explicitly empowers the President to act in a
certain area, there will be no question of Presidential encroachment into a purely
legislative area.
11 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
112 Id. at 230.
11s Id.
114 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
1 Id. at 637.
"l Cohen, Self-executing Executive Ageements: A Separation of Powers Prob-
lem, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 137 (1974); Has Congress perhaps preempted the field
of commercial aviation allowing no action by any other body? Perhaps it has;
however, preemption as a federal law question has generally applied only to areas
where states (not the President) have attempted to act.
117354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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abridged by the international agreements of the President or prob-
ably even by the Congress. However, the Court has never made
such an explicit ruling in civil cases, such as a case that might
arise under the Bermuda II Agreement.
Because of the Court's reluctance to deal with the problems of
presidential executive agreements and conflicts between the Presi-
dent and Congress unless absolutely necessary, it is likely that
any court action on the basis of some alleged unconstitutionality
of Bermuda II would not prompt the Supreme Court to render
the Agreement invalid without an extremely clear and substantial
showing of unconstitutionality. The difficulties that would result
from an invalidation of Bermuda II would be enormous and the
Court, realizing this, would more than likely be unwilling to allow
the status quo of the Agreement to be disturbed absent flagrant
presidential abuses. Despite the fact that most other countries
around the world treat air services bilaterals as treaties,"" there
is little likelihood that the Executive Branch, which has always
considered them best handled by executive agreements, will
quickly change its position on the matter. Should Congress dis-
pute this stand, it certainly has the power to establish precise,
specific guidelines that the President will be required to follow, or
it may, by statute, reserve the area of air services agreements to
itself and require ratification of such agreements as treaties.11'
It lies within the congressional prerogative to legislate away the
difficulties in this area, and perhaps specific congressional action
would be the fastest and most effective way of resolving the
problem.
Clearly, the future of the Bermuda II forebodes problems and
controversies for the major airlines of both the United States and
Great Britain. The practical problems of applying the terms of
the Agreement while avoiding disruption of smooth commercial
services between the United States and Great Britain will un-
doubtedly continue as these difficulties must be worked out on a
case-by-case basis. However, far more serious problems exist with
regard to the constitutionality of such air services agreements in
general. Whether the Federal Aviation Act "preempts" the regula-
11 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., August 1, 1977, at 26.
IX°LOYoLA, supra note 104, at 613.
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tion of commercial aviation and precludes the exercise of the
executive power to conclude international air services agreements
governing routes is highly debatable. The question has not been
resolved by court rulings and awaits further clarification. Certainly,
the Bermuda II agreement resolved some difficulties faced by
British and American aviators in the past. However, the fairly
broadly-termed language of the document allows much room for
interpretation and controversy. The British accomplished a great
deal in Bermuda II. Many of the new provisions put the British
carriers on more of an even par with American airlines. By work-
ing for more favorable terms and getting them, the British have
apparently won the aviation "revolution" of 1976, and now the
United States must wait to see what the ultimate repercussions of
this victory will be.

